To fix a software bug, you must first find it. As software grows in size and complexity, finding bugs is becoming harder. To solve this problem, measures have been developed to rank lines of code according to their "suspiciousness" wrt being faulty. Engineers can then inspect the code in descending order of suspiciousness until a fault is found. Despite advances, ideal measures -ones which are at once lightweight, effective, and intuitive -have not yet been found. We present Doric, a new formal foundation for statistical fault localisation based on classical probability theory.
INTRODUCTION
Software fault localisation is the problem of quickly identifying the parts of the code that caused an error. Accordingly, the development of effective and efficient methods for fault localisation has the potential to greatly reduce costs, wasted programmer time, and the possibility of catastrophe [1] . In this paper, we focus on methods of lightweight statistical software fault localisation. In general, statistical methods use a given fault localisation measure to assign lines of code a real number, called that line of code's "suspiciousness" degree, as a function some statistics about the program and test suite. In spectrum-based fault localisation, the engineer then inspects the code in descending order of suspiciousness until a fault is found. The driving force behind research in spectrum-based fault localisation is the search for an "ideal" measure.
What is the ideal measure? We assume it should satisfy three properties. First, the measure should be effective at finding faults. A measure is effective if an engineer would find a fault more quickly using the measure than not. Following Parnin and Orson, and in the absence of user trials to validate it, we assume that experiment can estimate a measure's effectiveness by determining how often a fault is within the top "handful" of most suspicious lines of code under the measure [39] . Second, the measure should be lightweight. A measure is lightweight if an algorithm can compute it fast enough that an impatient developer does not lose interest. The current gold standard in speed is spectrum-based, whose values usually take seconds to compute and scale to large programs [51] . Third, an ideal measure should compute meaningful values that describe more than simply which lines of code are more/less "suspicious" than others. A canonical meaningful value is the likelihood, under probability theory, that the given code was faulty.
Debugging is an instance of the scientific method: developers observe, hypothesise about causes, experiment by running code, then crucially update their hypotheses. Doric allows the definition of fault localisation measures that model this process -measures that we can update in light of new data. In Section 3.6, we present cl u , a method for updating our cl measure that does just this.
To advance the search for an ideal measure, we propose a groundup re-foundation of statistical fault localisation based on probability theory. The contributions of this paper are as follows:
• We propose Doric: a new formal foundation for statistical fault localisation. Using Doric, we derive a causal likelihood measure and integrate it into a novel localisation method.
• We provide a new set of fundamental fault scenarios which, we argue, any statistical fault localisation method should analyze correctly. We show our new method does so, but that no sbh can.
• We demonstrate the effectiveness of cl in, what is to our knowledge, the largest-scale fault localisation experiment to date: cl is more accurate than all 127 known sbhs, and when a developer investigates only 6 non-faulty lines, no sbh outperforms it on Defects4J where the developer would find a fault 41.18% of the time.
All of the tooling and artefacts needed to reproduce our results are available at utopia.com.
PRELIMINARIES
To reconstruct statistical fault localisation (sfl) from the ground up, we must precisely define our terms. sfl conventionally assumes a number of artifacts are available. This includes a program (to perform fault localisation on), a test suite (to test the program on), and some units under test located inside the program (as candidates for a fault) [45] . From these, we define coverage matrices, the formal object at the heart of many statistical fault localisation techniques [51] , including our own.
Faulty Programs. Following Steimann et al.'s terminology [45] , a faulty program is a program that fails to always satisfy a specification, which is a property expressible in some formal language and describes the intended behavior of some part of the program. When a specification fails to be satisfied for a given execution (i.e., Vector Oracle t 1 ⟨1, 0, 2⟩ fail t 2 ⟨2, 0, 1⟩ fail t 3 ⟨2, 0, 2⟩ fail t 4 ⟨1, 2, 0⟩ pass t 5 ⟨0, 1, 2⟩ pass an error occurs), we assume there exists some lines of code in the program that cause the error for that execution, identified as the fault (aka bug).
Example 2.1. An example of a faulty c program is given in Fig. 1 (minmax.c), taken from Groce et al. [16] ). We use it as our running example throughout this paper. Some executions of minmax.c violate the specification least <= most (i.e., there are some executions where there is an error). Accordingly, in these executions, a corresponding assertion (the last line of the program) is violated. Thus, the program fails to always satisfy the specification. The fault in this example is labeled u3, which should be an assignment to least instead of most.
Test Suites. Each program has a set of test cases called a test suite T . Following Steimann et al. [45] , a test case is a repeatable execution of some part of a program. We assume each test case is associated with an input vector to the program and some oracle which describes whether the test case fails or passes. A test case fails if, by executing the program on the test case's input vector, the resulting execution violates a given specification, and passes otherwise.
Example 2.2. The test case associated with input vector ⟨0, 1, 2⟩ is an execution in which in1 is assigned 0, in2 is assigned 1, and in3 is assigned 2, the uuts labelled u1, u2 are executed, but the uuts labelled u3 and u4, are not executed. As the specification least <= most is satisfied in that execution (i.e. there is no violation to the assertion statement), an error does not occur. For the running example we assume a test suite exists consisting of five test cases T = {t 1 , . . . , t 5 }. Each test case is associated with an input vector and oracle as described in Figure 3 . For our example of minmax.c, the oracle is an error report which tells the engineer in a commandline message whether the assertion has been violated or not. [44] , blocks [3, 12] , branches [41] , and statements [21, 30, 53] . A uut is said to be covered by a test case if that test case executes the uut. Notationally, we define a set of units as U . For notational convenience in the definition of coverage matrics, U also contains a special unit e, called the error, that a test case covers if it fails. We let U * = U − {e} and U |U | = e. Example 2.3. In Figure 1 , the uuts are the statements labeled in comments marked u1, . . . , u4. Accordingly, the set of units is
Coverage Matrices. A useful way to represent the coverage details of a test suite is in the form of a coverage matrix. It will first help to introduce some notation. For a matrix c, we let c i,k be the value of the ith column and kth row of c. Definition 2.4. A coverage matrix is a Boolean matrix c of height |T | and width |U |, where for each u i ∈ U and t k ∈ T :
We abbreviate c |U |,k with e k . Intuitively, for all u i ∈ U * , c i,k = 0 just in case t k executed u i , and 0 otherwise. e k = 1 just in case t k fails, and 0 otherwise. We use the notational abbreviations of Souza etal [10] . k is
Intuitively, this is the number of test cases that execute u i and fail. k c i,k e k is c i ef . Intuitively, this is the number of test cases that do not execute u i but fail. k c i,k e k is c i ep . Intuitively, this is the number of test cases that execute u i and pass. k c i,k e k is c i np . Intuitively, this is the number of test cases that do not execute u i but pass. When the context is clear, we drop the leading c and the index i. A coverage matrix for the running example is given in Fig. 2 .
Spectrum-Based Heuristics. One way to measure the suspiciousness of a given unit wrt how faulty it is is to use a spectrumbased heuristic, sometimes called a spectrum-based "suspiciousness" measure [10] . Definition 2.5. A spectrum-based heuristic (sbh) is a function s with signature s : U * → R. For each u ∈ U * s(u i ) is called u i 's degree of suspiciousness, and is defined as a function of u i 's spectrum, which is the vector ⟨c i e f , c i nf
The intuition behind sbh's is that s(u i ) > s(u j ) just in case u i is more "suspicious" wrt being faulty than u j . In spectrum-based fault localisation (sbfl), uuts are inspected by the engineer in descending order of suspiciousness until a fault is found. When two units are equally suspicious some tie-breaking method is assumed. One method is choosing the unit which appears earlier in the code to inspect first. We shall assume this method in this paper.
We discuss a property of some sbh's. If a suspiciousness function s is single fault optimal then for all u i , u j ∈ U , if c i , then s(u i ) > s(u j ). Intuitively, this states if a measure is single-fault optimal then uuts executed by all failing traces are more suspicious than ones that aren't [28, 36] . This property is based on the observation that the fault will be executed by all failing test cases in a program with only one fault. An example of a single fault optimal measure is the Naish measure (see Table 1 ).
Example 2.6. To illustrate how an sbh can be used in sbfl, we perform sbfl with Wong-II measure s( [54] on the running example. s(u 1 ) = -2, s(u 2 ) = 0, s(u 3 ) = 3, and s(u 4 ) = 2. Thus the most suspicious uut (u 3 ) is successfully identified with the fault. Accordingly, in a practical instance of sbfl the fault will be investigated first by the engineer.
DORIC: NEW FOUNDATIONS
We present Doric 1 , our formal framework based on probability theory. We proceed in four steps. First, we define a set of models to represent the universe of possibilities. Each model represents a possible way the error could have been caused (Section 3.1). Second, we define a syntax to express hypotheses, such as "the ith uut was a cause of the error" and a semantics that maps a hypothesis to the set of models where it is true (Section 3.2). Third, we outline a general theory of probability (Section 3.3). Then, we develop a classical interpretation of probability (Section 3.4). Using this interpretation, we define a measure usable for fault localisation (Section 3.5). Finally, we present our fault localisation methods 3.6.
The Models of Doric
In our framework, classical probabilities are defined in terms of the proportion of models in which a given formula is true. To achieve this, we first define a set of models for our system. We first describe some notation used in the forthcoming definition of models here. Let j ∈ N and m j be a matrix, then m j i,k is the value of the cell located at the ith column and kth row of matrix m j , where this value is in {1, 0, •}. As with coverage matrices, the rows represent test cases and the columns represent units. Informally, for each cell m j i,k , 0 denotes u i was neither executed by t k nor a cause of the error e, 1 denotes u i was executed but was not a cause of e, and • denotes u i was executed by t k and was a cause of e. 
where for each t k ∈ T there is some u i ∈ U such that m
Informally, each model (also called a causal model) describes a possible scenario in which errors were caused. The scenario is epistemically possible -logically possible and (we have assumed) consistent with what the engineer knows. Underlying our definition are three assumptions about the nature of causation. First, causation is factive: if a unit causes an error in a given test case, then the uut has to be executed and the error both have to factually obtain for a causal relation to hold between them. Second, errors are caused: if an error occurs in a given test case, then the execution of some uut caused it. Third, causation is irreflexive: no error causes itself.
Example 3.2. The set of causal models M of the running example is given in Fig. 4 . Following Def. 3.1, there are 9 models {m 1 , . . . , m 9 }. M represents all the different combinations of ways uuts can be said to be a cause of the error in each test case. In Fig. 4 , we associate m 1 , m 2 , m 3 with the top three models, m 4 , m 5 , m 6 with the middle three models, and m 7 , m 8 , m 9 with the bottom three models.
The Syntax and Semantics of Doric
What sort of hypotheses does the engineer want to estimate the likelihood of? In this section, we present a language fundamental to the fault localisation task. This language includes hypotheses about which line of code was faulty, which caused the error in which test case, etc. We develop such a language as follows. First, we define a set of basic partial causal hypotheses H = {h 1 , . . . , h |U | }, where h i has the reading "the ith uut was a cause of the error". Second, we define set of basic propositions U = {u i , . . . , u |U | }, where u i here takes a propositional reading "the ith uut was executed". Definition 3.3. L is called the language, defined inductively over a given set of basic propositions U and causal hypotheses H as follows:
(
We use the following abbreviations and readings . ϕ ∨ ψ abbreviates ¬(¬ϕ ∧ ¬ψ ), read "ϕ or ψ ". ϕ ∧ ψ is read "ϕ and ψ ". ϕ ∨ ψ is read "ϕ or ψ ". ¬ϕ is read "it is not the case that ϕ". k ϕ is read "ϕ in the kth test case". e is read "the error occurred". In addition, we define L * , called the basic language, which is a subset of L defined as follows:
An important feature of L is that we abbreviate two additional types of hypotheses, as follows: First, H i is h i h j ∈H −{h i } ¬h j , where H i is read "the ith uut was the cause of the error", is called a total causal hypothesis for the error, and intuitively abbreviates the property that the ith unit was a cause of the error, and nothing else was. Second, we let f i is abbreviated t k ∈T k h i , where f i is read "the ith uut is a fault", is called a fault hypothesis, and intuitively abbreviates the property that the ith unit was a cause of the error in some test case.
We now treat the semantics of Doric. To determine which propositions in the language L are true in which models M, we provide valuation functions mapping propositions to models, as follows:
Definition 3.4. Let M be a set of models and let L be the language. Then the set of valuations is a set V = {v 1 , . . . , v |V | }, where for each t k ∈ T there is some v k ∈ V with signature v k : L → 2 M , defined inductively as follows:
is read "the models where ϕ in the kth test case". We give an example to illustrate. Example 3.5. We continue with the running example. Each of the following can be visually verified by checking the causal models in Figure 4 . v 1 (u 1 ) = ∅. Intuitively, this is because t 1 executes u 1 in no models. v 1 (u 2 ) = M. Intuitively, this is because t 1 executes u 1 in all models. v 1 (h 2 ) = {m 1 , . . . , m 6 } = M − {m 7 , m 8 , m 9 }. Accordingly, u 1 was a cause of the error in 6 out of 9 models. In contrast,
Accordingly, u 2 was the cause of the error in 3 out of 9 models. Finally,
Accordingly, in the third test case the 3rd uut was a cause of the error.
The Probability Theory of Doric
We want to determine the probability of a given hypothesis. We do this by presenting our theory of probability. The theory is based around the following assumptions: We assume the engineer does not always know which hypotheses are true of each test case. Accordingly, we want our probabilities about hypotheses to take an epistemic interpretation, in which the probabilities describe how much a given hypothesis should be believed. Definition 3.6. Let M, L, V be non-empty sets of models, a language and set of valuations respectively. Then, a probability theory is a tuple ⟨P, P, w⟩, where (1) w : 2 M → R (2) P = {P 1 , . . . , P |T | } is a set of probability functions, where for each v k ∈ V there is some P k ∈ P such that
(3) P is the expected likelihood function defined as follows:
The weight function is w and describes the relative likelihood of a set of models. P k (ϕ) is the probability that ϕ holds in the kth test case, and is defined as the proportion of models in which ϕ holds. P(ϕ) is the expected likelihood that ϕ, and is defined as the average probability that ϕ holds in a test case. We use the following readings: w(X ) is "the relative likelihood of the models in X". P k (ϕ) is "the probability that ϕ in the kth test case". P(ϕ) is "the expected likelihood that ϕ". We use the standard abbreviation of P(ϕ |ψ ) for P(ϕ ∧ ψ )/P(ψ ), which reads "the probability that ϕ when ψ ".
We now discuss immutable assumptions on w. In order to ensure P k satisfies standard measure theoretic properties, we assume w(∅) = 0, w(M) > 0, and
We allow any extension to the definition of w satisfying the above properties. When w is so defined, we say it provides an interpretation of the probability functions. For instance, one option is to formally define the relative likelihood of models in terms of the number of faults in them.
Finally, we establish the intuitive result that the likelihood of a given formula in the basic language is simply the proportion of test cases in which it is true. Let f be a function which intuitively measures the frequency in which a proposition is true in a test suite. Defined: f (ϕ) = f k (ϕ), where f k (ϕ) = 1 if v k (ϕ) = M and 0 otherwise. We then have the following result:
Using this result, we can identify many sbh's with an intuitive probabilistic expression stated within Doric. For example,
ep /|T |, P(¬u i ∧ ¬e) = c i np /|T |, and P(¬u i ∧ e) = c i nf /|T |. Using these four identities alone one can express the 40 sbh's of Lucia etal. [32] , and the 20 causal and confirmation sbh's of Landsberg at al. [26, 28] .
Classical Interpretation
What conditions hold on the relative likelihood function? The question here is which causal models are more likely than others. To illustrate our framework, we will impose conditions on the relative likelihood function to give us a classical interpretation of probability. Informally, probability has a classical interpretation if it satisfies the condition that if there are a total of n mutually exclusive possibilities, the probability of one of them being true is 1/n [19] . The rationale for this is the principle of indifference (aka the principle of insufficient reason), which states that if there are a total of n mutually exclusive possibilities, and there is not sufficient reason to believe one over the other, then their relative likelihoods are equal. Formally, for all x, y ∈ M, w({x }) = w({y}). This condition is also known to describe a uniform distribution over the set of models. In the remainder of this paper, we assume this condition. The assumption is sufficient for the following result:
Proposition 3.8. Equation 3 follows given indifference
Proof. See Appendix. □ Intuitively, the probability of a proposition is the ratio of models in which it is true. Equation 3 is tantamount to assuming that, ab initio, the engineer knows next to nothing about what caused the error in each test case (each causal model is equally likely). In practice, we think is probably wrong for the purposes of software fault localisation (causal models with a small number of faults are probably more likely). The main reason for its assumption is that it keeps our forthcoming fault localisation methods simple and tractable.
We now illustrate how we can use the classical interpretation to give us a definition of P(f i ). Following our readings, P(f i ) measures the likelihood the ith unit was a fault. This describes is the proportion of models where i is a cause of the error in some test case (Intuitively, P(f i ) is the the proportion of models where there is a "•" somewhere in the ith column of a model). We call this measure a measure of fault-likelihood. Accordingly, the assumption of indifference gives us the following result. Let i ∈ [0, |U |] and m, t ∈ [0, |T |] be free variables, and let ρ k = u i ∈U * c j,k , then:
Proposition 3.9. Equations 4, 5, & 6 follow given indifference.
Proof. See Appendix. □ On the running example, the equations can be used to find
Measure for Fault Localisation
To develop an efficient fault localisation method based on our framework, we need to do two things. First, we need to identify a probabilistic expression which tells us which unit should be investigated first when looking for faults. Second, we need to identify an efficient way to compute this. In this section, we address these issues in turn.
Which unit should be investigated first when looking for faults? To answer this, it is tempting to answer -the unit which is the most likely fault (max u i ∈U * P(f i )). However, under the classical interpretation, this will be ineffective for fault localisation as it ignores passing test cases. Moreover, we do not think that this is necessarily the unit which should be investigated first. Rather, we think that the unit which is estimated to have the highest propensity to cause the error should be investigated first. To see the difference, we observe that something might have a high fault-likelihood, but simultaneously have a low propensity to cause errors. Think of a rarely executed bug -we think these will be of less interest to an engineer. Accordingly, the measure we should use will be an expression describing this propensity.
We make two assumptions in our development. First, we make the assumption that it is possible to find the cause, as opposed to a cause, where finding the cause is preferable. Second, following Popper [40] , we assume the propensity of some x to y is described by probabilistic expressions of the form P(y|x). Accordingly, the propensity of a unit to cause an error can be analogously described in our framework with P(H i |u i ). Following our readings of this section, this is read "the likelihood a given uut was the cause of an error when it was executed". We call this measure a measure of causal likelihood (or cl for short), and for some cases is able to identity a some faults with certainty, in the sense that if P(H i |u i ) = 1 then P(f i ) = 1. Our answer to our question is thus max u i ∈U * P(H i |u i ).
We now address the question of how to compute cl efficiently. One option is to generate all the matrices in the set of causal models, and (following our assumption of indifference) find the probability directly by counting models. However, this is intractable in general. A more tractable alternative is to find an expression for P(H i |u i ) which is stated purely as a function of a given coverage matrix c and is also tractable. We present this in Eq. 7 and show it follows from the definitions of this section. As follows: Let c be a given coverage matrix. Let ρ k abbreviate u j ∈U * c j,k . Informally, ρ k is the number of units executed by t k . Then for each u i ∈ U * :
Proposition 3.10. Equation 7 follows using the definitions.
Proof. To aid in the proof, it will be useful to establish the following equations. Let t ∈ [1, |T |] and i ∈ [1, |U |], then:
We now sketch the proof of these equations. 8 follows by the definition of conditional probability. 10 follows by def. 3.6. It remains to give the proofs for equations 9, 11 and 12. As these are longer they are consigned to the appendix in proposition A.3.
Finally, it is easily observed that Eq. 7 holds using equations 8-12. As follows:
To illustrate cl, we find P(H i |u i ) for each of u 1 , . . . , u 4 for the the running example of minmax.c. We begin with P (H 1 |u 1 ) . We begin by evaluating the numerator of Eq. 7, which is equal to (0x0)/(2 2 − 1)
The denominator is equal to 2. Thus P(H 2 |u 2 ) = 0/2 = 0. We now do P(H 2 |u 2 ). The numerator is equal to
The denominator is equal to 2. Thus P(H 2 |u 2 ) = (1/3)/2 = 1/6. P(H 3 |u 3 ) = (1/3 + 1/3 + 1) / 3 = 0.5, and P(H 4 |u 4 ) = (1/3)/2 = 0.16. Accordingly, the fault u 3 is estimated to have the highest likelihood of causing an error when executed.
We now discuss time-complexity. It is observed that the time complexity of computing the value of both fault and causal likelihood (P(f i ) and P(H i |u i ) respectively) is a (small) constant function of the size of the given coverage matrix. This makes it comparable to spectrum-based heuristics in terms of efficiency, which also has this property. To answer our stated question explicitly, to compute max u i ∈U * P(H i |u i ) efficiently we can simply compute Equation 7 for each u i ∈ U using the given coverage matrix c, and return the unit with the highest likelihood.
Finally, we illustrate how our measures of fault and causal likelihood provide a small armory of meaningful measures useful to the engineer. Returning the running example, the engineer might assume the principle of insufficient reason and say of the third unit "the probability it is a fault is 1" and "will likely cause the error when executed" (given P(f 3 ) = 1 and P(H 3 |u 3 ) > 1 2 respectively). We think these quantities are more meaningful than what is reported by some of most effective established sbh's customized to sbfl. For instance "the GP05 measure reports the third unit to have a suspiciousness degree of 0.5576" does not have the same meaning, or suggest actionability to the engineer in the same way.
Semi-Automated Methods
We now address the question of how to use Eq 7 in a fault localisation method. We present two such methods. We then compare our methods to sbfl.
Our first method is similar to the sbfl procedure discussed in Section 2. Here, each u i ∈ U is associated with a causal likelihood, as determined by using Eq. 7. The engineer then inspects uuts in the program in descending order of causal likelihood (also called suspiciousness) until a fault is found. When two units are equally suspicious, the unit higher up in the code is inspected first. We call this procedure cl n (which abbreviated "causal likelihood with no updating").
We now present our second method. We begin with some motivation. To start the fault localisation process, we assume the engineer will want to investigate max u i ∈U * (P (H i |u i ) ). However, in the course of further investigation about the program, the engineer will discover new facts, symbolized ϕ (for some ϕ ∈ L). To find faults, the engineer will then want to find the causal likelihood of different units given those facts. Accordingly, the unit the engineer should investigate next should be given by the following formula:
The above motivates our second method, which is described as follows. First, ϕ is set to a tautology, and the value of Eq. 13 is computed. Suppose the unit returned by Eq. 13 is u j . Then, if u j is inspectd by the engineer, and if found to be faulty, the search terminates. If not, we assume ¬h j and compute the value of Eq. 13 letting ϕ = ¬h j . Suppose the unit returned is u k . The process is similar to before -if u j is faulty, the search terminates. If not, we assume ¬h k and compute the value of Eq. 13 letting ϕ = ¬h j ∧ ¬h k . The search continues in this way until a fault is found. We call this procedure cl u ("causal likelihood with updating"). Characteristic of cl u is that clues discovered throughout the investigation can be used to give us new probabilities.
We now discuss implementation details of the second method. In a practical implementation, we can use Equation 7 in the following way. Let F ⊆ H be the set of indices to causal hypotheses known to be false. Then we can compute Eq. 13 by redefining ρ k as u j ∈U c j,k − h n ∈F c n,k , and use the expression on the rhs of Eq. 7 to find the value of the argument of Eq. 13. Proof of this is included in an extended version of this paper. Secondly, in a practical implementation, we also allowed ourselves to limit the size of F (called an update bound), which represents the number of updates an engineer is willing to make. If an update bound is set and reached, then cl u procedure continues without any further updates.
We now discuss valuable formal properties pertaining to the second method. We observe that the process of fault localisation is much like a game of hide and seek -insofar as when an engineer inspects one location for a fault and it is not there, then our estimations for the likelihood it is elsewhere should increase. We think it is desirable for a fault localisation method to satisfy a similar property. Accordingly, in this section we show that conditioning on causal likelihood (as per the method of cl u ) satisfies a similar property, as follows: Proposition 3.12. Let c be a coverage matrix where c i,k = c j,k = 1 for some t k ∈ T . Then P(H i |u i ) < P(H i |u i ∧ ¬h j ).
Proof. See Appendix. □
In the remainder of this section, we compare our new methods with sbfl in light of two new fundamental fault scenarios which, we argue, any statistical fault localisation method should analyze correctly. Consider the coverage matrix above. We argue that for any sbh s to be adequate for fault localisation it should satisfy the property that s(u 3 ) > s(u 2 ). Our reasoning follows from the assumption that, when an error occurs, there is some executed uut that was a cause of it. Accordingly, we can be certain that u 3 is a fault -nothing else could have caused the error in the second test case. However, we are not certain that u 2 is a fault (as far as we know u 1 could have caused the error instead in the first test case). However, it is impossible for any sbh to satisfy s(u 3 ) > s(u 2 ), because spectrum for u 3 and u 2 is the same (i.e. Now consider the coverage matrix above. Suppose we begin the fault localisation process, without any prior knowledge about which units are faulty or non-faulty. Now, according to spectrumbased functions, each unit is equally suspicious (as the spectrum for each unit is the same = ⟨1, 1, 0, 0⟩). Suppose, following the sbfl method, we choose to investigate u 1 , and discover it not to be faulty. Accordingly, on the assumption that in every failing test case some executed unit is a cause of the error, we can now be certain that u 2 is a fault given this new information. However, we cannot be so certain that either u 3 or u 4 is a fault (as it might be the case it isn't but the other is). Thus upon learning u 1 isn't a fault, degrees of suspiciousness should be updated to make u 2 more suspiciousness than u 3 and u 4 . However, sbfl is inadequate for fault localisation because it has no facility for updates of this sort. In contrast, as a consequence of Proposition 3.12 the cl u method gets it right. At step one, for all u i ∈ U , P(H i |u i ) = 1/3. Suppose the engineer learns u 1 is not faulty. Thus, the engineer evaluates all u i ∈ U − {u 1 } next. P(H 2 |u 2 ∧ ¬h 1 ) = 1, and remain P(H 3 |u 3 ∧ ¬h 1 ) = P(H 3 |u 3 ∧ ¬h 1 ) = 1/3.
EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we compare the performance of our new methods with all known 127 sbhs on large faulty programs. The goal of the experiment is to establish whether cl n and cl u are effective at fault localisation than sbhs . 
Setup
We first present the benchmarks used in our experiment, then describe the methods compared in the experiment, the methods we used to evaluate the performance of the different methods. Finally, we present some research questions for our experiment to answer. We first describe the benchmarks used in our experiments. We use two sets of Java benchmarks, Defects4j and Steimann's. Each set of benchmarks contains different programs, each program is associated with different initial faulty versions, and each faulty version is associated with a test suite (which includes some failing test cases) and a method for identifying the faulty uuts. Statistics for the two sets of benchmarks are presented in Tables 2 and 3 respectively. The first column gives the name of the program, the second the number of initial faulty versions (V), the third the number of tested units (lines of code (loc) for Defects4j, methods (M) for Steimann). The fourth gives the (rounded) average number of units represented in a coverage matrix for the initial faulty versions (U). The number of units represented in the matrix is always smaller than the number of tested units, as columns in the coverage matrix were removed in our experiments if the corresponding unit was not executed by a failing test case (such units are assumed non-faulty). The fifth and sixth columns give the average number of failing (F) and passing (P) test cases represented in a coverage matrix for each initial faulty version. in Table 2 , The last column gives the average number of faulty units represented in each coverage matrix for each initial faulty version (B). In the case of Steimann's each initial version always had one injected fault, so we have not included that column for its corresponding table. Finally, we could not find a reliable source for the number of lines of code for Mockito. We now discuss particular details about the two sets of benchmarks.
The first set of benchmarks are taken from the Defects4J repository. This is a database consisting of Java program versions with real bugs fixed by developers, and are described in detail by René et al. [23] . As the authors confirm, not all of the versions were usable with software fault localisation methods. A version was unusable if it had a list of faults which did not correspond to an executed line of code (and thus the techniques considered in this paper would not be able to find them). This was because the faults in these versions include omissions of code. Thus, the proportion of usable versions are reported in the Vs column of Table 2 (for instance 24/26 versions were usable for Chart). To generate coverage matrices, we used pre-existent code from the Defects4J repository. 2 The second set are the Steimann benchmarks. This is a database of large Java programs with injected faults introduced via mutation testing, and are described in detail by Steimann et al. [45] . The benchmarks are described in Table 2 . To generate multiple fault versions, the authors also created one thousand 2,4,8,16, and 32 fault versions, which were created by combining fault injections from the original 1-fault versions. This meant there were a total of 50K+ program versions associated with our second set of benchmarks. We used pre-existent code to generate coverage matrices for us, provided to use by the compilers of the benchmarks [45] .
We now discuss the methods we compare in our experiments. We wish to compare sbfl methods with the methods developed in this paper. We describe these in turn. We include in our comparison 127 different sbhs . These measures are described in Landsberg [26] , and is an attempt at an exhaustive list of sbhs available in the literature 3 . As a baseline for our comparison, we also compared the constant measure (which returns a constant value). We also compare cl u (with an update bound of 20). Finally, we also compare cl n when used as a substitute sbfl measure for the sbfl procedure discussed in Section 2. This allowed us to compare the benefits of updating.
We now discuss our methods of evaluation. The methods we compare all follow the same format insofar as one inspects more suspicious units first, with units which feature higher up in the code inspected first in the case of ties. We wish to evaluate a method in terms of how quickly a fault would be found using this approach. Accordingly, First, for each coverage matrix, a method's accuracy is defined as the number of non-faulty units investigated using the technique until a fault is found. A method's accuracy for a given set of coverage matrices associated with that benchmark is defined as the average accuracy for that set. For a given set of coverage matrices, the most accurate method is the one with the lowest accuracy score.
The second method of evaluation is as follows. For a given cut-off of n and a given set of coverage matrices, a method's n-score is the percentage of times a fault is found by investigating n non-faulty units using the method. For a set of coverage matrices and given n, the method with the best n-score is the one with the highest n-score.
We provide values of n in the range [0, 10] . Following the suggestions of Parnin and Orso [39] , we provide this range as we think 10 units is a realistic upper bound on the number of units an engineer will investigate using a given method. Accuracy and n-scores off score are both called a method's scores in general. For each of our sets of benchmarks, the overall accuracy score was the average accuracy over all coverage matrices in that set of benchmarks. We now discuss our research questions. Accordingly, for each of our benchmarks, our experimental setup is designed to help answer the following research questions:
(1) Which method is the most accurate? (2) Do our new techniques have the best n-scores for n ∈ [0, 10]? Finally, all of our results can be reproduced. The Steimann benchmarks can be downloaded from http://www.feu.de/ps/prjs/EzUnit/ eval/ISSTA13/. The Defects4J benchmarks can be downloaded from https://github.com/rjust/defects4j. All the sbh 's compared are available in [26, 28] .
Results
We first directly answer our two research questions. First, Which method is the most accurate? For Defects4j cl n has the best accuracy score (213.6). For Steimann's benchmarks, cl u has the best accuracy score (4.9) (cl n came second with 5.02). Second, Do our new techniques have the best n-scores for any n ∈ [0, 10]? For Defects4j, cl n had the best 6-score (41.18) . For Steimann's benchmarks, for all n ∈ [0, 10], cl u had the best n-scores for each of the sets of 4, 8, 16, 32 faults. cl n had the second best scores in these cases.
We first discuss the results for Defects4j, and begin with the overall accuracy scores. To show the range, we report the measures which were ranked 1, 2, 10, 50, 90, 100. These were cl n (213.6), D3 (216.36), Lewis (224.79), AddedValue (232.46), cl u (241.22) Gower (248.72) respectively. The constant measure was ranked last (643.78). We now summarise the n-scores for each n ∈ [0, 10]. The n-scores for a range of methods are presented in Figure 6 . We describe the figure as follows. For each method in the legend, a point was plotted at (x, y) if in y% of the versions a fault was localized after investigating x non-faulty lines of code. To show the range of performance across methods, the methods in the legend are associated with the aforementioned methods. Of all 127 methods compared, cl u did not get the best n-score for any of n ∈ [0, 10], and cl n tied with the best 6-score (41.18 -tied with Dennis, Ochiai, and f9830).
We now discuss the results for Steimann's benchmarks. We first summarise the overall accuracy scores. To show the range of scores, we report the methods which were ranked 1, 2, 3, 10, 20, 50, 100. These were cl u (4.9), cl n (5.02), Klosgen (9.02), SokalSneath4 (9.51), calf, (9.77), Tarantula (10.54), GP23 (15.68). The constant measure came last (38.69). We now summarise accuracy scores on sets of 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32 fault programs. On 1-fault programs, Naish received the best accuracy score (9.81). cl u came 72nd (14.5) and cl n came 74th (14.69). On each of the sets of versions with multiple faults, cl u and cl n came 1st and 2nd respectively, as follows: On 2-fault programs, the top 3 were cl u (9.87) cl n and (10.04) and D3 (13.1). On 4-fault programs, the top 3 were cl u (5.14) cl n and (5.3) and GeometricMean (10.34). On 8-fault programs, the top 3 were cl u (2.79) cl n and (2.94) and Klosgen (7.57). On 16-fault programs, the top 3 were cl u (1.16) cl n and (1.24) and AddedValue (6.04). On 32-fault programs, the top 3 were cl u (0.4) cl n and (0.44) and Certainty (4.87).
We now summarise the n-scores. For each n ∈ [0, 10], and for the set of 1-fault programs, Naish outperformed cl u or cl n at every value n. For each n ∈ [0, 10], and for the set of 2-fault programs, D3 outperformed cl u or cl n at every value of n. For each n ∈ [0, 10], and for each of the sets of 4, 8, 16, 32 fault programs, cl u or cl n outperformed all sbfl methods at every value of n. cl u and cl n n-scores were always similar (+/-2 percent of on one another), thus to give an indication of how they perform as the number of faults grows in a program, we present Figure 6 . Here, for each of the 1, ..., 32 fault programs, a point was plotted on (x, y) if in y% of the versions a fault was localized after investigating x non-faulty lines of code.
In the remainder of this section, we discuss our results. We first discuss differences in value between our evaluative methods (accuracy and n-scores). In general, n-scores are more important than accuracy from the point of view of an engineer looking for a technique to use in practice. As has been demonstrated in a study by Parnin and Orso, " programmers will stop inspecting statements, and transition to traditional debugging, if they do not get promising results within the first few statements they inspect" [39] . n-scores are more important from this perspective.
We now discuss the difference in quality between accuracy and n-scores. In general, the accuracy scores for all techniques on Defects4j are poor. For instance, using the most accurate method cl n , one would expect to investigate 213.6 lines of code on average. In contrast, if one limited oneself to investigating fewer than 10 non-faulty lines of code, then one would expect to find a fault almost half the time. For instance, using cl n we can expect to find a fault 41.68% of the time if one limited oneself to investigating 6 non-faulty lines of code (here, nothing did better than cl n ). This suggests that accuracy scores were affected by outliers in which the technique only located a fault after investigating many lines of code (we discuss two such outliers below).
We now discuss why methods performed differently on Defects4j as opposed to Steimann. First, in the useable Defects4j versions, the average number of failing test cases way very small, as detailed by Table 2 . In contrast, the number of failing test cases in Steimann benchmarks was much larger. We think this improved the performance of different methods, as more failing tests provide more information about the behavior of the fault. Secondly, in the useable Defects4j versions, 38.4% had only a single failing test case. Accordingly, cl u , cl n and most sbh's performed equivalently on these benchmarks in terms of which units get ranked higher/lower, this meant that the performance of high performing methods tended to converge. Thirdly, we emphasize that the uuts in Steimann's benchmarks were calls to subclasses, which are often larger than lines of code (the units for Defects4j), and thus the scores look better for Steimann's benchmarks. Fourthly, for Steimann's benchmarks many of the failing test cases only executed a small part of the overall program. This advantaged our new methods cl u and cl u , which take advantage of short failing executions to increase their causal likelihood.
We now discuss the difference in accuracy between cl u and cl n . As described earlier, the performance of cl u is slightly worse than cl n on Defects4j, where the opposite is observed on Steimann's benchmarks. We investigated reasons why for this, and after investigating the cases where cl n outperforms cl u in terms of accuracy on Defects4j, we discovered there were two major outliers that made cl u 's overall accuracy score lower (in Chart-5 cl u had to investigate 3177 more lines of code, and Math-6 cl u had to investigate Math-6 1585 more lines of code). For Defects4j, cl u outperformed cl n in only two cases, whereas cl n outperformed cl u in 50. These results (tentatively) suggest the conclusion that cl n is better to use in practice when the program and test suite resemble the benchmarks in Defects4j, and cl u when the program and test suite resemble the benchmarks in Steimann's benchmarks.
Finally, we think the scores of our new techniques demonstrate they are a strong contender to sbfl heuristics when integrated into a practical fault localisation approach.
Threats to Validity
Our threats are informed by the recent work of [23] , who perform a similar test on the Defects4j benchmarks, and by Steimann et al., who perform similar experiments on the Steimann benchmarks [45] .
The main threat is wrt how well our results generalize to practical instances of fault localisation. Given the variety of programs, faults, test suites, and development styles in "the wild" it has not yet been shown whether studies of this sort generalize well. Wrt the Steimann benchmarks, there is the additional threat that artificial faults are not good proxies for real faults. Problems of this sort confront many software fault localisation studies [45] . To anticipate these problems, we have tried to improve the degree to which our results can generalise by ensuring our experiment was large. To our knowledge our experiment is currently the largest in the literature in terms of three different dimensions: number of methods compared (127+), range of faults studied , and number of program versions used (50k+).
RELATED WORK
The recent survey of Wong et al. [52] identifies the most prominent fault localisation methods to be spectrum based [4, 13, 24, 28, 32, 36, 42, 47, 59] , slice based [6, 29, 46, 53, 61] , model based [33, 55, 58] , and mutation-based [34, 38] . For reasons of space, we discuss closely related statistical approaches.
We first discuss sbh, which is one of the most lightweight methods. In general, sbh's designed to solve the general problem of fault localisation (for programs with any number of faults) are heuristics which estimate how "suspicious" a given unit is. However, what "suspicious" means is (to our knowledge) never fully defined. In the absence of an approach which tells us this, research is driven by the development of new measures with improved experimental performance [4, 13, 24, 28, 32, 36, 42, 47, 59] . Many of these top-performing measures are presented in Table 1 : D3 was developed by raising the numerator of a previously used measure to the power of 3 [49] . Zoltar was developed by adding 10000 nf ep ef to the denominator of a previously used measure [18] . GP05 was found using genetic programming [59] . Ochiai was originally designed for Japanese fish classification [4, 37] . In this paper, we have tried to improve upon the theoretical connection between developed measures and the fault localisation problem.
We now discuss theoretical results for sbfl. Theoretical results include proving potentially desirable formal properties of measures and finding equivalence proofs for classes of measures [11, 28, 35, 36, 56] . Yoo et al. have established theoretical results that show that a "best" performing suspicious measure for sbfl does not exist [60] , arguing there is "no pot of gold at the end of the program spectrum rainbow" in theory. With this result, there remains the problem of providing better formal foundations, and deriving improved measures shown to satisfy more formal properties. Our work in this paper is designed to addresses this.
Two more heavyweight approaches to multiple fault localisation are as follows. Both of these approaches use fault models in their analysis. Here, a fault model is a set of units with the property that each failing trace executes at least one of them. The first is the simple classical approach of Steimann et al. [43] , where the probability of a unit being faulty is the proportion of fault models it is a member of. A second method is Barinel [5] , which uses Bayesian analysis and heuristic policies to estimate the health of uuts, and uses a tool Staccato [2] to generate large sets of fault models. The main issue confronting these approaches is scalability, given the requirement of generating large sets of fault models. Additionally, in one study the implementation of Barinel was unable to scale to the Steimann benchmarks [27] . We have purposely designed our approach to avoid this issue by having a different definition of a model which facilitates tractable fault localisation methods.
We discuss miscellaneous statistical approaches here. One type of approach uses machine learning, including support vector machines and neural network approaches, to perform fault localisation [7, 48] . However, these approaches do not make the case that a recourse to machine learning methods is necessary and that a principled approach is impossible. Other approaches include the crosstabbased method of Wong [50] , the hypothesis testing approach of Liu [31] , and the probabilistic program dependence graph approach of Baah [8] . Landsberg et al. provide an axiomatic setup which uses sbhs in a probabilistic framework, but does not use models [27] .
We now discuss how lightweight statistical methods have been used in the following applications. Firstly, in semi-automated fault localisation in which users inspect code in descending order of suspiciousness [39] . Secondly, in fully-automated fault localisation subroutines within algorithms which inductively synthesize (such as cegis [20] ) or repair programs (such as GenProg [14] ). Thirdly, as a technique combined with other methods [9, 22, 24, 57] . Finally, as a potential substitute for heavyweight methods which cannot scale to large programs. Thus, there is a large field of application for the techniques discussed in this paper.
Finally, for the approach of classical probability, the overview of James [19] , the introduction of Tijms [17] , and the measuretheoretic foundations of Kolmogorov [25] all provided bases upon which to develop our approach.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have demonstrated there is a principled formal foundation (Doric) available for statistical fault localisation that does not require recourse to spectrum-based heuristics. In general, Doric opens up a world of different meaningful probabilities which can be reported to the engineer to aid in understanding a faulty program. To illustrate the utility of Doric, we developed two lightweight measures of fault and causal likelihood and integrated the latter into our fault localisation method cl n . In large-scale experimentation, cl n was demonstrated to be more accurate when compared with all known 127 sbhs . In particular, on the Steimann benchmarks cl n was almost twice as accurate as the best performing sbh -you'd expect to find a fault by examining 5.02 methods as opposed to 9.02. cl n also demonstrated to have the highest 6-score on Defects4j. We think the combined effort demonstrates that our measure of causal likelihood is lightweight, effective and maintains a meaningful connection to fault localisation.
We now discuss directions for future work. First, a major step in our work is to experiment with different weight functions (w). There are many ways to do this, so it is our hope there will be as much experimentation over different weights as there has been comparing sbhs. A natural place to start is to define the relative likelihood of a model as a function of the number of faults in that model in conjunction with some given cumulative distribution function. Following work on fault distributions in software [15] , we wish to weigh models with a small number of faults to have a higher relative likelihood. The formal development in this paper lays much of the foundations critical for this step.
A PROOFS
In this appendix, we present the proofs supporting the main text. To simplify, we have put a proof later in our order of presentation if a part of that proof relies on a part of an earlier proof.
To aid in the proofs we introduce some notation. For each m j ∈ M, m j i,k
